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Abstract. Distance Bounding (DB) is a security technique through
which it is possible to determine an upper-bound on the physical distance
between two parties (denoted as verifier and prover). These protocols
typically combine physical properties of the communication channel with
cryptographic challenge-response schemes. A key challenge to design
secure DB protocols is to keep the time required by the prover to process
the challenges and compute and transmit the responses as low as possible.
For this purpose, different implementation approaches have been proposed
in the literature, both in the analog as in the digital domain. Moreover,
different types of communication channels have been proposed as well to
find an optimal balance between security and implementation feasibility.
This paper is the first to evaluate the feasibility of implementing DB
protocols using quantum communication. Unlike conventional DB pro-
tocols, which execute the rapid-bit exchanges over a Radio Frequency
(RF) or ultrasound channel, our quantum-based DB protocol makes use
of quantum-bit (qubit) transmissions and detection during the challenge-
response phase. Our protocol offers security against distance fraud, mafia
fraud and terrorist attacks. We also discuss how to protect against some
specific implementation attacks, such as double read-out and quantum
attacks, and give an overview of the main implementation challenges as
well as possible limitations.
Key words: Distance bounding, Quantum transmission and measure-
ment, Qubits.
1 Introduction
Distance Bounding (DB) protocols allow to establish an upper-bound on
the physical distance between two parties which are typically denoted
as verifier and prover. For this, DB protocols rely on cryptography and
physics. For example, RF-based DB protocols leverage on the fact that it is
impossible for adversaries to transmit signals faster than the speed of light.
Brands and Chaum [1] were the first to introduce a DB protocol to counter
relay attacks in Automatic Teller Machines (ATM) systems. Subsequently,
a number of articles [2,3,4,5,6,7,8] has contributed not only to improve or
2 Aysajan Abidin, Eduard Marin, Dave Singele´e, and Bart Preneel
design new DB protocols, but also to implement these protocols. There
are two main families of DB protocols: those that are derived from the
protocol proposed by Brands and Chaum [1] and the ones that are based
on the protocol proposed by Hancke and Kuhn [2]. All DB protocols have
a setup and a rapid-bit exchange phase. In the setup phase, the verifier
and the prover agree or commit to some information that will be used in
the next protocol phase(s). In the rapid-bit exchange phase, which is the
most difficult phase to implement due to severe timing constraints, the
verifier sends a series of single-bit challenges to which the prover replies
with single-bit responses. The verifier can then obtain its distance to
the prover by measuring the Round-Trip Time (RTT) between sending
its challenge and receiving the response from the prover. In some DB
protocols, there is also a verification phase for checking that all protocol
steps were performed using the parameters previously agreed on.
The goal of DB protocols is typically to protect against the following
attacks: (i) distance fraud, (ii) mafia fraud and (iii) terrorist fraud. In
a distance fraud attack, a dishonest prover tries to convince a verifier
that it is in the verifier’s close proximity while in reality it is far away.
Mafia fraud (or relay attacks) involve an honest prover, a verifier and a
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) adversary. More specifically, the adversary
uses a proxy-prover close to the verifier and a proxy-verifier close to the
legitimate prover to relay over a long distance the messages exchanged
between both parties. In a terrorist fraud attack, a dishonest prover
collaborates with the adversary to convince the verifier that he is in its
close proximity, while actually it is the adversary who is close to the
verifier. It is common to assume that the prover only wants to collude
with the adversary without revealing any information about its long-term
secret key. This would prevent any attempt by the adversary to use the
long-term secret key to conduct attacks at a later stage.
Our contributions. This paper investigates the feasibility of imple-
menting quantum-based distance bounding protocols. The main physical
principle upon which our protocol is based, is that unlike bits sent over
conventional channels, qubits cannot neither be measured without mod-
ifying their states nor be decoded before fully receiving them. Without
knowing the basis of the qubits, which the prover and verifier agreed
upon based on a shared secret key, adversaries can only guess the qubits
that are being sent. Therefore, our proposal by itself is resistant to some
of the well-known DB attacks. We also note that our proposal could be
transformed into a post-quantum DB by just replacing the PseudoRan-
dom Function (PRF), used in the initialisation phase, by a post-quantum
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PRF. Based on a theoretical analysis, we estimate the delay introduced
by each of the hardware components at the prover, and conclude that
our solution keeps this delay at a reasonable level compared to other
implementation approaches. Finally, we also evaluate our scheme against
some implementation-specific attacks, more in particular double read-out
and quantum attacks, and then elaborate on the main implementation
challenges and possible limitations.
Paper outline. Section 2 gives an overview of related work. Section 3
provides the necessary background on quantum communication and qubits.
Next, section 4 describes our quantum-based distance bounding protocol,
whereas a detailed security analysis of our solution is given in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses the feasibility of our proposed implementation approach.
Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
2 Related work
The security provided by DB protocols, which measure the RTT to estimate
the distance between prover and verifier, relies on the fact that the prover
is able to process the challenge and then compute and transmit the
response in negligible time compared to the propagation time. If the
verifier overestimates the prover’s processing time (i.e., the prover can
process the challenge faster), the prover can pretend to be closer than it
actually is. On the contrary, if the verifier underestimates the prover’s
processing time, the prover may not be able to successfully execute the
DB protocol with the verifier, even when it is in its close proximity. As the
processing time depends only on the prover’s hardware, which is not under
the control of the verifier, for DB protocols to be resistant to attacks the
processing time at the prover needs to be as close as possible to zero.
Intuitively, one possibility would be to send the response over an ultra-
sonic channel, provided that this channel is relatively slow compared to
the processing time at the prover. However, ultrasonic-based DB protocols
are vulnerable to worm-hole attacks [9]. This attack involves a MITM
adversary who uses both a proxy-prover and a proxy-verifier to convert
the audio signal to a radiofrequency (RF) signal (and vice versa) in order
to accelerate the transmission time on the relay channel. This would
allow adversaries to extend the maximum distance from which the verifier
successfully authenticates the prover by several orders of magnitude.
For practical realisations of DB protocols over an RF channel, the
main challenge for the prover is to compute the response using a function
that can be executed significantly fast. We distinguish between two types
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of functions, depending on whether they are conducted in the analog
or digital domain. Brands and Chaum [1] proposed that the response
sent by the prover is the result of the XOR between the challenge and
a value agreed upon between the verifier and the prover in the setup
phase. Hancke and Kuhn [2] proposed to choose a value from two locally
stored registers at the prover depending on the challenge sent by the
verifier. Although both operations are relatively simple, they require the
prover to convert the signal from the analog to the digital domain using
an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), demodulate the signal to obtain
the challenge bit, compute and modulate the response bit and convert the
signal from the digital to the analog domain using a Digital-to-Analog
Converter (DAC). This process typically results in a processing time delay
in the order of at least a few hundred nano seconds. This large delay
allows adversaries with dedicated hardware to successfully execute the
protocol with the verifier from several dozen meters away.
Another approach consists of computing the response by the prover
based on a function that can be directly executed in the analog domain.
Rasmussen and Capkun proposed an analog function – which they call
Challenge Reflection with Channel Selection (CRCS) – for which the prover
reflects the challenges sent by the verifier in a specific way depending on the
received challenge and the response (i.e. the value of the register) [4]. The
prover demodulates the signal to recover the challenges only after finishing
the rapid-bit exchange phase. This approach does not introduce any delay
in the time-critical rapid-bit exchange phase, while still allows the prover to
prove knowledge of the challenge bits in the last protocol phase. However,
Ranganathan et al. found that the CRCS implementation is vulnerable to
a double read-out attack, which allows an adversary to obtain the values of
the prover’s two registers simultaneously [6]. Ranganathan et al. proposed
an hybrid solution – which they call Switched Challenge Reflector with
Carrier Shifting (SCRCS) – that prevents the double read-out attack by
introducing a new digital component that disables part of the analog
circuitry after detecting the challenge [6]. However, both the analog and
hybrid approaches require complex hardware and storage at the prover.
We are the first to investigate the feasibility of implementing DB
protocols using quantum communication. The closest work to ours is the
quantum-based positioning system proposed by Buhrman et al. [10]. In
their paper, multiple verifiers interact with the prover to determine its
position. In our paper, we apply quantum techniques to DB protocols.
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3 Background on quantum communication
In the classical (non-quantum) domain, communication can always be
eavesdropped or copied. This is in contrast to quantum communication
where the transmitted information is encoded in non-orthogonal quantum
states that cannot be reliably read or copied, due to the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle in quantum physics. Any attempt by an adversary
to eavesdrop the quantum communication will introduce random errors.
Qubits. A qubit is a unit of quantum information, just as a bit (0
or 1) is the classical unit of information. A qubit is a vector in a 2-
dimensional Hilbert space (a vector space with inner product). The basis
t|0y “
„
1
0

, |1y “
„
0
1

u for a qubit is called the computational basis,
while the basis t|`y “ p|0y ` |1yq{?2, |´y “ p|0y ´ |1yq{?2u is called the
diagonal (or the Hadamard) basis. In general, a normalised quantum state
can be expressed as a superposition of |0y and |1y as
a |0y ` b |1y ,
where a, b P C satisfying |a|2 ` |b|2 “ 1.
If we measure a qubit in state a |0y ` b |1y in the computational basis
(i.e., if the state is projected on the computational basis), then with
probability |a|2 we obtain |0y and with probability |b|2 we obtain |1y. If
the state of a qubit is unknown, the values a and b cannot be determined
with a single measurement. And after a measurement, say in the t|0y , |1yu
basis, the qubit state collapses into |0y or |1y, which is different from the
original state.
Now let us take a closer look at the four states: |0y, |1y, |`y, and |´y.
It is straightforward to see that:
|0y “ p|`y ` |´yq{?2
and
|1y “ p|`y ´ |´yq{?2.
Therefore, if the qubits |0y and |1y are measured in the computational basis
(i.e., projected onto the t|0y , |1yu basis), then the states are not disturbed;
whereas the measurement in the Hadamard basis destroys the state, since
in this case |`y and |´y are obtained with equal probability. Similarly, if
the qubits |`y and |´y are measured in the Hadamard basis, then the states
are not disturbed; whereas the measurement in the computational basis
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destroys the state, since in this case |0y and |1y are obtained with equal
probability. It is exactly this principle that we will use in our protocol.
More specifically, in our proposal we make use of these four states,
which are usually called the BB84 states in quantum key distribution
(QKD) [11]. Namely, we propose to implement the rapid challenge-response
phase of a DB protocol by employing qubits, as opposed to the classical
approach using RF signals or ultra-wide-band (UWB) pulses. These four
states correspond to different polarisations of photons. These photons are
sent from prover to verifier, or vice versa, via laser beams. The states |0y
and |1y respectively correspond to horizontallyÑ and vertically Ò polarised
photons, while the states |`y and |´y to Õ and Ô polarised photons. The
qubit |0y or |`y is used to encode the classical bit value 0 and |1y or |´y
the value 1. The qubits are measured either in the computational or the
Hadamard basis. In what follows, we let 0 to denote the computational
(`) basis and 1 the Hadamard (ˆ) basis.
Table 1: An encoding rule. In our proposal, the value 0 corresponds to the
computational (or simply ` basis), and 1 to the Hadamard (or simply ˆ)
basis.
Data Computational (or `) basis Hadamard (or ˆ) basis
0 |0y (i.e., Ñ) |`y (i.e., Õ)
1 |1y (i.e., Ò) |´y (i.e., Ô)
4 Our quantum-based distance bounding protocol
Our approach is based on the exchange of polarised photons. Similarly
as in the DB protocol of Hancke and Kuhn, the prover and verifier first
execute a setup phase in which random nonces are exchanged. Based on
these nonces and a shared secret, both parties compute the output a of
a PseudoRandom Function (PRF). During the rapid-bit exchange phase,
the verifier encodes randomly chosen challenge bits into polarisation states
of photons in the bases determined by the bitstring a.
For example, if ai “ 0, then a challenge bit 0 would be encoded as the
Ñ photon, whereas a challenge bit 1 would be encoded as the Ò photon.
Similarly, if ai “ 1, then a challenge bit 0 would be encoded as the Õ
polarised photon, whereas a challenge bit 1 would be encoded as the Ô
polarised photon. If a “ 01011 and the challenge bits are 10010, then a
series of photons polarised as Ò, Õ, Ñ, Ô, Õ, respectively, will be sent by
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the verifier. The prover then decodes the photons in the bases determined
by the PRF output (denoted as a) and sends its responses as photons
that encode the decoded results in the bases determined by the bits of a.
Since the encoding and decoding bases are the same, the verifier receives
photons in the same polarisation states as the ones that were sent. From
the RTT of the photons, the verifier calculates an upper-bound on the
physical distance between itself and the prover.
This is similar to QKD, except that now the two communicating
parties use the same bases as opposed to the randomly chosen bases in
the case of QKD. An adversary would need to guess what encoding basis
is used to successfully intercept and decode the verifier’s signal and then
send the result back to the verifier. Therefore, there is a 50% chance that
the adversary guesses wrong. Thus, as a consequence of the quantum
uncertainty principle, the adversary will destroy the information encoded
by the verifier and render the received responses uncorrelated to the
challenges that are sent.
A schematic description of a DB protocol employing the aforementioned
technique, using polarised photons, is given in Fig 1. As can be seen, during
the challenge-response phase, instead of sending and receiving classical
challenge-response pairs, the verifier sends and receives quantum challenge-
response pairs. As long as the prover is the legitimate prover with whom
the verifier computed a “ fxppNv, Npq, the verifier always receives photons
that are in the same polarisation states as the ones that are sent, since
the photons are encoded/decoded in the same bases determined by the
bit values of a. The prover stores the decoded bits in a register c and uses
them during the verification phase. In this third phase of the protocol,
the prover computes a MAC on the ID of prover and verifier, the nonces
exchanged in the setup phase, and the bitstring c. This last step is critical
for security. Without the prover sending a MAC in the verification phase,
an adversary could just reflect all the photons back to the verifier without
actually performing any measurements at all.
To summarise, the main components needed for our solution are an
encoder, a decoder, and a data processing unit. The encoder consists of
a tuneable polariser which polarises incoming photons or laser pulses.
The incoming pulses are polarised according to the previously mentioned
encoding rule, e.g., c “ 0 is encoded as Ô polarised photon if the cor-
responding register value is 1. The decoder consists of a detector and a
data processing unit. The detector measures the photons in ` basis if
the register value is 0 and in ˆ basis if the register value is 1. The data
processing unit analyses the measurement result and outputs 0/1.
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Verifier
xp
Prover
xp
Nv Ð t0, 1un Np Ð t0, 1un
Nv
Np
a = fxp(Nv,Np) a = fxp(Nv,Np)
cÐ t0, 1un
Encode c in a
Ò,Õ,Ô,Ñ,Ô, ¨ ¨ ¨
Decode in a and re-encode
Store decoded challenges in c
Ò,Õ,Ô,Ñ,Ô, ¨ ¨ ¨
Decode in a and get c1
Check if c “ c1
MACxppIDp, IDv, Np, Nv, cq
Check MAC
Fig. 1: Example of a quanutm-based DB protocol using polarised photons
in the rapid-bit exchange phase. It should be noted that each challenge is
sent only after the verifier received the response to the previous challenge.
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5 Security Analysis
This section analyses the resistance of our protocol to distance fraud,
mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. In addition, we identify two
implementation-specific attacks, and show how to prevent them. We also
present some of the possible limitations when realising quantum-based
DB protocols.
5.1 Protocol Analysis
Distance fraud attack. A dishonest prover can attempt to shorten the
distance to the verifier in several ways. The adversary can either (i) predict
the challenge, (ii) reply before fully receiving the challenge (i.e. lower the
processing delay by replying too early) or (iii) try to reduce the processing
delay by using more sophisticated hardware components. However, as the
verifier chooses its challenges at random, if the adversary opts for sending
its response before receiving the challenge, he can guess the challenges
sent by the verifier only with probability p1{2qn. Furthermore, due to the
properties of qubits, it is impossible for adversaries to learn their value
before fully receiving them. This is in contrast with conventional RF-based
systems, where one can learn the value of a bit by only partially decoding
the received signal [12].
The existing distance bounding implementations provide processing
time delays at the prover in the order of 1-100 ns. Fig 2 shows the
hardware components used by the verifier and the prover in our proposal.
We estimate that the processing delay at the prover will be approximately
10 ns, as this is typically the usual delay in practical QKD implementations.
Thus, an adversary can (at best) shorten the distance by 3 meters. While
our proposal introduces a processing time delay that is slightly higher
than some of the analog and hybrid solutions, it decreases the hardware
complexity of the system.
Mafia fraud attack. Adversaries can follow two different strategies
to perform mafia fraud attacks: (i) early-detect and late-commit or (ii)
replay-and-forward.
The early-detect and late-commit attack can be divided into four steps:
(i) early-detect the challenge from the verifier, (ii) forward the challenge to
the prover, (iii) early-detect the response from the prover and (iv) forward
the response to the verifier. However, our solution by itself is resistant
to this attack, since it is impossible for adversaries who do not know the
correct basis to measure the photons without modifying their states.
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Laser
Laser
Encoder
start
CLK
Decoder
stop
CLK
Decoder
Encoder
c
$ÐÝ t0, 1u
Check c2 ?“ c
Register Register
polarised photon
polarised photon
Store c1
verifier prover
Fig. 2: High-level schematic description of our quantum-based approach
during one challenge-response round. The verifier selects a random chal-
lenge bit c, encodes it into a polarisation of a photon emitted from the
photon source (Laser) in the basis determined by the first bit of the
Register, and starts the clock. The prover decodes the photon in the basis
determined by the first bit of the Register and obtains c1, which is then
encoded into a polarisation of a photon emitted from the prover’s photon
source (Laser) in the same basis used for decoding. The prover also stores
c1, which will be used later in the verification phase. The verifier decodes
the incoming photon in the basis previously used to encode the challenge
bit and obtains c2, stops the clock, and checks whether c2 “ c. This
process is repeated as many times as the number of bits in the Register.
If the number of rounds in which c2 “ c is above a threshold, then the
verifier can use the maximum of all the RTT to compute the physical
distance of the prover.
In the replay-and-forward attack, the adversary reflects the challenge
to the verifier while still being able to forward the challenge to the prover.
To perform this attack, the adversary would have to use a Photon Number
Splitter (PNS). It is important to point out that this attack, which is
analogous to PNS attacks on QKD implementations, can only be conducted
if the challenge contains more than one photon per pulse. In that case,
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the adversary could reflect one photon, and decode another photon in the
same pulse. The goal of the adversary is to convince the verifer that the
prover decoded and encoded the photon correctly. Since our protocol has a
verification phase where the prover proves knowledge of the challenges sent
by the verifier, the adversary needs to forward the challenge to the prover
as well. To prevent this attack, one has to avoid that photons in a pulse
can be splitted. Therefore, it is necessary to use efficient single-photon
sources in the design, and hence select the most appropriate laser source.
Assuming the photon splitting attack is prevented by the selection of
the laser source, the mafia fraud attack succeeds with probability
`
3
4
˘n
,
i.e. an adversary can pre-ask the prover for responses – if he guesses the
pre-asked challenge correctly he always wins the round, otherwise he needs
to guess the response with probability
`
1
2
˘
.
Terrorist fraud attack. In the literature, protocols that are terrorist-
fraud resistant are all based on a similar design approach [13]. Therefore
to make our protocol terrorist-fraud resistant, one needs to implement a
response function where the prover’s key is revealed if the prover discloses
all the possible responses (i.e. the outputs of the PRF) to the adversary.
To achieve this, the register (a in our protocol) is constructed as follows.
The first half of the register is the output of the PRF, while the second
half is the XOR of the first half with the shared long-term key. This way,
the adversary would learn the prover’s secret long-term key if the register
a would be shared with him. As a result, the prover can share only half of
the registers with the adversary, meaning that the adversary knows half
of the responses and needs to guess the rest. The success probability for
terrorist fraud is therefore
`
3
4
˘n
.
5.2 Implementation attacks
No-photon attack. Most lasers typically emit a small number of photons
per pulse (e.g. 0.3 photons per pulse) that are distributed according to
a Poisson distribution. As a result, most pulses have no photons, some
others contain 1 photon, and only a few contain 2 or more photons. We
can distinguish between three types of situations for each of the protocol
rounds: (i) when a single photon is sent per pulse, (ii) when two (or more)
photons are sent per pulse and (iii) when no photon is sent per pulse.
The first case will not be studied further since it is the ideal case and
does not introduce any security problems. The second case is relevant to
perform mafia fraud attacks and is explained above. In the third case, the
adversary does not need to send any response at all. This would drastically
reduce the security level of the protocol, since the adversary wins in all
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rounds where no pulses are being sent. To overcome this limitation, one
could increase the number of rounds of the protocol, to ensure that there
are sufficient rounds with at least one photon being exchanged.
Double read-out attack. The goal of this attack is to exploit the
specific implementation of the DB protocol to obtain the values of the two
registers of the prover. A similar attack could be performed on our scheme
to obtain the bases being used by the prover and the verifier. The adversary
could recover the basis being used only if the prover would reuse a basis
to measure different challenges and responds to each of these challenges.
In practice, the attack would work as follows: the adversary first lets the
prover and the verifier start executing the protocol and exchanging the
nonces. The adversary then follows a pre-ask strategy, it first executes the
rapid-bit exchange phase with the prover to obtain the basis being used
and then executes the protocol with the verifier. For this, the adversary
first encodes a photon using a basis (chosen at random) and sends it to
the prover. The idea is that the adversary exploits the implementation
of the protocol by sending multiple photons, using the same base, during
one round of the protocol. We can distinguish between two situations
depending on whether the adversary has guessed the basis used by the
prover. If so, then all the challenges (i.e. photons) sent during the same
round will be decoded correctly by the prover, and all the responses will
be equal to the challenges. If the guess was wrong, the prover encodes the
bits using the wrong basis, and will obtain random bits for each of these
challenges. The adversary will notice that the responses are not equal,
and hence the wrong basis was used.
The key aspect of this attack is that the adversary could send multiple
challenges during a single round. To prevent this type of attack, the prover
needs to have a reliable detector that updates its setting after measuring
the challenges (i.e. switch to the basis of the next round) and hence avoids
basis reuse in a single round.
6 Feasibility analysis
Our proposal is similar to the quantum transmission and measurement
phase of a BB84 type QKD protocol. The only difference is that in our
case the preparation and measurement bases for the qubits are kept secret,
while they are publicly announced in QKD. QKD has long been successfully
implemented, and there are even commercially available QKD products.
Since the QKD setup for the quantum transmission and measurement
can be used as is to experimentally realise our proposal, the feasibility of
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our proposal is not an issue. However, we are interested in keeping the
actual processing delay at the prover as low as possible. While the actual
experimental demonstration is beyond the scope of this paper, based on
the experimental results on QKD we estimate that the delay can be around
10 ns. In future work, we want to perform experiments using the QKD
setup to validate the short processing delay of our proposed solution.
The three main components on both the prover and verifier sides are
a single photon source, a single photon detector, and a data processing
unit. All of these components are available on the market.
7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the feasibility of implementing distance bound-
ing protocols based on quantum communication. We proposed a quantum-
based distance bounding protocol that uses a function to compute the
prover’s response based only on knowing the basis to measure the quantum
bits. We analysed its security against various attacks and gave a theoretical
analysis of the processing delay at the prover.
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